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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
Daniel J. Jenkins, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-212544 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Charleston County 
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 27537 
Heard March 3, 2015 – Filed July 1, 2015 
REVERSED 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy 
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant 
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant 
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, all of 
Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of 
Charleston, for Petitioner. 
Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of 
Columbia, for Respondent. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: The State appeals the court of appeals' decision 
reversing the trial court's finding that a search warrant for samples of Daniel 
Jenkins's (Respondent) DNA was valid, and remanding for an evidentiary hearing 
regarding whether the State would have inevitably discovered Respondent's DNA 
during the course of its investigation.1 State v. Jenkins, 398 S.C. 215, 727 S.E.2d 
761 (Ct. App. 2012). We reverse, and reinstate Respondent's conviction for 
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree (CSC-First). 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2006, H.M. (the victim) lived by herself in downtown Charleston, South 
Carolina. At the time, she worked for a local bakery, to which she commuted by 
bicycle or bus. During her commute, the victim frequently passed Jabbers, a local 
grocery store, and casually greeted the people loitering outside, many of whom 
lived in the area and often gathered there.  Although the victim did not know any 
of these people beyond exchanging a passing greeting, she came to learn that one 
of the people with whom she exchanged pleasantries was nicknamed "Black."
The victim testified that on April 5, 2006, she arrived home from work, 
consumed several alcoholic beverages, and fell asleep around 8 p.m.
Approximately two hours later, the victim awoke to a knock at her door.  She 
opened the door and saw Black, who asked the victim if she either wanted to go 
out and share a drink, or if she would lend him money to buy beer that he could 
then bring back to her apartment.  When the victim declined, Black continued to 
pester her, asking her those same two questions repeatedly. 
The victim stated she became uncomfortable, so she took a step back into 
her apartment to place some distance between herself and Black.  However, Black 
stepped in "aggressively" behind her, and the two sat on the victim's sofa for a 
brief time while Black smoked a cigarette.  Shortly thereafter, Black began making 
lewd sexual demands and threatening the victim, stating that if she did not comply 
with his demands, he would kill her. 
The victim firmly told Black to leave because her boyfriend was coming 
1 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (establishing and explaining the 
inevitable discovery doctrine).
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over.2  Thereafter, Black grasped a heavy glass candleholder and repeatedly struck 
the victim around the forehead, ears, and mouth. 
A struggle ensued, during which Black pushed the victim's cordless 
telephone out of her reach. Ultimately, Black wrestled the victim's pants off of her, 
tore off her underwear, and forcibly engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim.  
Black then threatened to kill the victim if she told anyone about the encounter, and 
left the victim's apartment. 
After the victim could not find her telephone, she ran outside for help.  She 
unsuccessfully knocked on several neighbors' doors and attempted to stop three 
passing cars before encountering a woman on the street near Jabbers.  The woman 
asked the victim what happened to her, but before the victim could speak, Black 
approached the women. 
The victim stated that she became overwhelmed by Black's presence and 
started crying and asking to use a telephone.  Black grabbed the victim's arm and 
"half-carried, half-guided" the victim to an alley across the street.  He told her that 
he had her telephone and would return it if she washed the blood off of her face.  
Black then forcibly held the victim's head under a nearby faucet. 
After Black returned the telephone, the victim ran back to her apartment and 
hid under a tarp on the side of the building while she called the police.  She 
described her assault to the responding officers and told them that her attacker's
nickname was Black. 
The officers were familiar with a man from the neighborhood whose 
nickname was Black, but whose true identity was Respondent.  They searched for 
and located Respondent within a matter of minutes in an abandoned building 
across the street from Jabbers, where he was sleeping nude.  Other officers 
escorted the victim to Jabbers's parking lot, where she positively identified 
Respondent as her attacker. 
After identifying Respondent, the victim underwent a rape examination.  
The nurse conducting the examination testified that the victim had a blackened eye, 
a bloody nose, a split lip, bleeding on the inside of her mouth, bruising on her arms
2 The victim did not have a boyfriend at the time, and was merely trying to induce 
Black into leaving her apartment. 
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and shoulders, abrasions and lacerations on her genitals, and defensive wounds on 
her hands. Further, the nurse found semen on vaginal and rectal swabs taken from 
the victim, as well as on various clothing and bodily swabs.  The nurse stated that 
while the wounds and semen could be consistent with consensual sex, they were 
more likely the result of forcible sex. 
In processing the alleged crime scene at the victim's apartment, police 
officers found blood stains on the victim's sofa, and her ripped underwear and a 
heavy glass candleholder lying on the floor.  A fingerprint examiner testified that 
two of the three fingerprints recovered from the candleholder were Respondent's. 
The following day, a police officer obtained a search warrant for 
Respondent's DNA to compare to the DNA recovered from the rape examination 
swabs. The affidavit necessary to establish probable cause for the warrant read: 
On 4/5/06 at approximately 22:30 hours while at [the victim's
address], the subject, [Respondent] . . . , did enter the victim's
residence and threatened to kill her if she did not comply with his 
demand to perform oral sex on her.  The victim attempted to fight the 
subject, however he overpowered her by striking her in and about her 
face using a glass candle holder [sic]. 
The subject then penetrated the victim's vagina with his tongue 
and penis. The DNA samples of blood, head hair and public hair will 
be retrieved from the suspect by [] trained medical personnel in a 
medical facility. The collection of these samples will be conducted in 
a noninvasive manner.[3] 
A forensic DNA analyst developed a DNA profile from the rape 
examination swabs, and compared that profile to Respondent's DNA profile.  The 
DNA profiles matched, with a 1 in 8.6 quintillion chance that the semen on the 
rape examination swabs came from an unrelated person.
Prior to the State introducing it at trial, Respondent moved to suppress the 
DNA evidence, arguing that the affidavit did not establish probable cause because 
it omitted:  (1) the source of the officer's information regarding the assault, so that 
3 The officer did not supplement the affidavit with oral testimony in front of the 
Magistrate who granted the warrant. 
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the Magistrate could judge the source's credibility; (2) how the officer came to 
suspect Respondent of the crime; (3) the victim's positive identification of 
Respondent as her attacker in Jabbers's parking lot; (4) photographs and physical 
evidence obtained of both the victim and the alleged scene of the crime; and (5) the 
results of the rape examination that the victim underwent, including the genital 
abrasions and lacerations, as well as the presence of semen.  The trial court denied 
the motion to suppress.4 
Ultimately, the jury convicted Respondent of CSC-First.  Because of 
Respondent's two prior convictions for CSC-First and carjacking, both of which 
are "most serious offenses" under section 17-25-45(C)(1) of the South Carolina 
Code, the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (2014).
Respondent appealed, and the court of appeals remanded the case for an 
additional evidentiary hearing. Jenkins, 398 S.C. at 215, 727 S.E.2d at 761. 
Specifically, the court of appeals found the search warrant to obtain Respondent's
DNA was invalid for two reasons.  Id. at 221–25, 727 S.E.2d at 764–66.  First, the 
court of appeals held that the affidavit in support of the warrant did not establish 
probable cause because it contained only conclusory statements; failed to set forth 
the source of the facts contained therein; and lacked any information allowing the 
Magistrate to make a credibility determination regarding the source of the 
information.  Id. at 222–24, 727 S.E.2d at 764–66. Second, the court of appeals 
found that the affidavit was defective because it did not contain any indication that 
the police had obtained DNA evidence from the rape examination, and thus it did 
not establish that Respondent's DNA would have been relevant to the investigation.  
Id. at 224–25, 727 S.E.2d at 766.  Moreover, the court of appeals found that 
admitting the DNA evidence was not harmless error because it bolstered the 
victim's credibility regarding two critical facts:  that Respondent was her attacker, 
and that the sexual intercourse was not consensual. Id. at 225–27, 727 S.E.2d at 
766–67.
Despite reversing the trial court's admission of the DNA evidence, the court 
of appeals did not order a new trial, but instead remanded the case for an 
4 As a result, Respondent's counsel changed strategies mid-trial from attempting to
blame the assault on the victim's abusive ex-boyfriend to attempting to characterize 
the encounter as consensual sexual intercourse between Respondent and the victim. 
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evidentiary hearing. See id. at 227–30, 727 S.E.2d at 767–69.  The court of 
appeals did so in response to the State's argument that Respondent's DNA would 
have been inevitably discovered regardless of the defective search warrant.  Id.
Specifically, the State asserted that Respondent's DNA was already on file in the 
State's DNA Identification Record Database due to his prior conviction for CSC-
First. See id. at 228, 727 S.E.2d at 768; see also S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-610,        
-620(A), -620(B), -640, -650(A) (2007 & Supp. 2014) (allowing the State to 
obtain, store, and use a criminal defendant's DNA sample as a result of prior 
convictions). However, because the trial court found the search warrant was not 
defective, the State contended it never had the opportunity to present this evidence.  
Jenkins, 398 S.C. at 228, 727 S.E.2d at 768. The court of appeals therefore 
remanded Respondent's case to the trial court to determine whether the inevitable 
discovery doctrine applied in this particular situation.  Id. at 230, 727 S.E.2d at 
769.
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision. 
ISSUE
Whether admission of the DNA evidence obtained as a result of the 
defective search warrant constituted harmless error? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only.  State 
v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16, 732 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012).  The court is "bound by the 
trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."  Id.
ANALYSIS
The State has not challenged the court of appeals' finding that the affidavit 
did not establish probable cause, and that the search warrant to obtain Respondent's
DNA was thus invalid. As such, we need only determine whether the trial court's 
error in admitting the DNA evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
whether remand for an evidentiary hearing was the appropriate remedy. 
The United States Supreme Court has distinguished between trial errors and 
structural defects in the trial mechanism itself.  State v. Mouzon, 326 S.C. 199, 204, 
485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1997) (discussing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 
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(1991)). Structural defects "affect the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to 
end," whereas trial errors "occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, and 
may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented 
in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–08, 309) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Differentiating between structural and trial errors serves "to 
enforce procedural safeguards while ensuring that inconsequential, technical errors 
do not result in a new trial." State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 115, 771 S.E.2d 336, 
343 (2015) (Hearn, J., dissenting). Most errors that occur during trial, including 
those that violate a defendant's constitutional rights, are trial errors that are subject 
to harmless error analysis.  State v. Rivera, 402 S.C. 225, 246, 741 S.E.2d 694, 705 
(2013).
Harmless error analyses are fact-intensive inquiries and are not governed by 
a definite set of rules. State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 447–48, 710 S.E.2d 55, 60 
(2011); State v. Davis, 371 S.C. 170, 181, 638 S.E.2d 57, 63 (2006). Rather, 
appellate courts must determine the materiality and prejudicial character of the 
error in relation to the entire case. Byers, 392 S.C. at 448, 710 S.E.2d at 60; see 
also Black, 400 S.C. at 27–28, 732 S.E.2d at 890 (stating that with respect to 
wrongly-admitted evidence impacting a witness's credibility, the Court should 
consider "the importance of the witness's testimony to the prosecution's case, 
whether the witness's testimony was cumulative, whether other evidence 
corroborates or contradicts the witness's testimony, the extent of cross-examination 
otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the State's case").  An error is 
harmless if it did not reasonably affect the result of the trial.  State v. Bryant, 369 
S.C. 511, 518, 633 S.E.2d 152, 156 (2006); see also State v. Tapp, 398 S.C. 376, 
389, 728 S.E.2d 468, 475 (2012) ("Engaging in this harmless error analysis, we 
note that our jurisprudence requires us not to question whether the State proved its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether beyond a reasonable doubt the trial 
error did not contribute to the guilty verdict."). 
Here, the court of appeals found that absent the DNA evidence, the case 
boiled down to a credibility contest between the victim—asserting that she was 
sexually assaulted by Respondent—and Respondent—alternatively asserting that 
the perpetrator of the assault was the victim's abusive ex-boyfriend, or that any 
sexual intercourse between the victim and Respondent was consensual.  We find 
this conclusion to be incomplete based on our review of the totality of the evidence 
presented by the State. 
15 
  
 
 
 
 
                                        


Notwithstanding the DNA evidence, there was abundant, independent 
evidence in the record from which the jury could have found Respondent guilty.  
For example, the victim testified at length, giving a detailed account of the assault 
and the events that followed. Moreover, the State presented physical evidence 
regarding the results of the rape examination conducted on the victim, including 
the extensive nature of the victim's injuries, the defensive wounds on the victim's
body, and the presence of semen. The State likewise presented testimony from the 
nurse who performed the rape examination that the victim's wounds were 
consistent with sexual assault.  Other testimony revealed that the responding 
officers described the victim as "roughed up pretty good," and the rape 
examination nurse described the victim's face as "quite bruised."  Additionally, the 
investigation of the alleged crime scene at the victim's apartment uncovered the 
victim's ripped underwear and blood and fingerprint evidence corroborating the 
victim's version of events.  Finally, the responding police officers independently 
connected Respondent to the crime by his nickname "Black" due to their previous 
dealings with him.  Further, after the officers searched for Respondent and found 
him naked and asleep a short distance away from the scene of the crime, the victim
positively identified Respondent as her attacker within thirty minutes of the 
assault. 
Accordingly, contrary to the court of appeals' assertion, this case was not 
dependent on the credibility of the victim and Respondent, with the DNA evidence 
serving as the only physical evidence that Respondent committed the assault.  Cf.
State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 480, 716 S.E.2d 91, 94–95 (2011) ("We further 
find the trial court's admission of the reports did not amount to harmless error.  
There was no physical evidence presented in this case.  The only evidence 
presented by the State was the children's accounts of what occurred and other 
hearsay evidence of the children's accounts.  Because the children's credibility was 
the most critical determination of the case, we find the admission of the written 
reports was not harmless." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).  Rather, there was 
other physical evidence that the victim was sexually assaulted, and that 
Respondent was the perpetrator.5 
5 Moreover, the DNA evidence only established that the victim and Respondent 
engaged in sexual intercourse, which Respondent's counsel conceded to the jury.  
However, the DNA evidence did not establish whether the encounter was 
consensual or non-consensual, which the rape examination nurse stated under 
16 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                             
 
 
 


Further, while we agree that the DNA evidence was compelling, there is no 
jurisprudence in this State that DNA is either necessary or conclusive to 
establishing a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather, there are 
countless cases in which the State has not presented DNA evidence—either 
because it could not or chose not to do so—and a jury nonetheless properly 
convicts the defendant. DNA evidence is merely one way to establish that the 
accused is the perpetrator. However, the presence or absence of DNA evidence 
does not taint the remainder of the evidence in the record, nor does it overwhelm
the jury's ability to make credibility determinations and decide whether a defendant 
is guilty.  Like with fingerprinting and blood typing, both of which are similarly 
compelling types of evidence, DNA evidence can be disputed.   
Accordingly, we find the admission of the DNA evidence in this case was 
harmless error, and we decline to adopt a per se rule that a new trial is mandatory 
any time DNA evidence is wrongly admitted.6 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the portion the court of appeals'
decision remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding the applicability 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine.  Instead, we reinstate Respondent's conviction 
for CSC-First because any error made by the trial court was harmless. 
REVERSED. 
BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, J., 
dissenting in a separate opinion.
cross-examination by Respondent's counsel.  Thus, the DNA evidence did not 
boost the victim's credibility that the intercourse was forced on her.  Rather, the 
victim's claim that the intercourse was unwanted was supported by, inter alia, 
evidence of the injuries to her face and genitals, including the tears, abrasions, and 
defensive wounds.
6 Because this issue is dispositive, we do not reach the State's second issue 
regarding whether it would have inevitably discovered Respondent's DNA during 
the course of its investigation.  See Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Palmetto State 
Transp. Co., 382 S.C. 295, 307, 676 S.E.2d 700, 706 (2009).
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JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to 
reverse the court of appeals as in my view, the erroneous admission of the DNA 
evidence—which the majority finds "compelling"—was not harmless.  I would 
remand for a new trial. 
The majority holds that notwithstanding the DNA evidence, there was abundant, 
independent evidence in the record from which the jury could have found 
Respondent guilty. In addition to the victim's testimony—which in my view is the 
only evidence Respondent sexually assaulted the victim—the majority relies on the 
results of the rape examination on the victim,7 the testimony from the nurse who 
performed the rape examination that the victim's face was "quite bruised," the 
testimony from the responding officer that described the victim as "roughed up 
pretty good," and the presence of the victim's ripped underwear and "blood and 
fingerprint evidence"8 at the scene. In my opinion, this evidence merely shows that 
the victim was likely sexually assaulted and that Respondent has been in the 
victim's home, not that Respondent was the perpetrator of the sexual assault.  
Accordingly, this case is indeed a battle of credibility between the victim and 
Respondent regarding Respondent's involvement in the sexual assault.  In my view, 
the majority fails to point to the existence of overwhelming evidence of guilt as the 
victim's testimony was the only evidence that identified Respondent as the 
perpetrator of the sexual assault. See State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 109-10 & n.7, 
771 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2015) (stating the materiality and prejudicial character of the 
error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case and the wrongful 
admission of evidence can be deemed harmless where there is other overwhelming 
evidence of guilt).9 
7 The results of the rape examination were not conclusive that a sexual assault 
occurred. In fact, the nurse who performed the rape examination agreed that 
everything discovered in the pelvic examination could be consistent with 
consensual intercourse. 
8 Blood was found on the victim's couch and Respondent's fingerprints were 
recovered from a glass candleholder.   
9 In my view, the majority's reliance in footnote 5 on the concession by 
Respondent's counsel during argument that Respondent and the victim had 
consensual sex is improper because the concession was a necessary by-product of 
the lower court's erroneous decision to admit the DNA evidence.  Respondent 
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Since I find the admission of the DNA evidence not harmless, I address the 
propriety of the court of appeals' decision to remand for an evidentiary hearing.  In 
my view, remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the inevitable 
discovery doctrine applies is improper.  Here, inevitable discovery is advanced as 
an additional sustaining ground and it is well settled that the evidence forming the 
basis for an additional sustaining ground must appear in the record on appeal.  
There is no evidence in the record on appeal that Respondent's DNA is in the State 
DNA database. See Rule 220(c), SCACR; I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 
338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000).  I would reverse respondent's
conviction and remand for a new trial.   
For the reasons given above, I would find the erroneous admission of DNA 
evidence not harmless, reverse respondent's conviction, and remand to the lower 
court for a new trial. 
should not be bound by this concession because his attorney unsuccessfully sought 
to ameliorate the prejudice from an erroneous evidentiary ruling. 
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of Capital Trial Division of SC Commission on Indigent 
Defense, all of Columbia, for Respondent. 
JUSTICE PLEICONES: We granted the State's request for a common law writ of 
certiorari to review a pretrial circuit court order in this capital retrial proceeding.  
We affirm the circuit court's order. 
Respondent's first capital conviction and sentence were reversed on appeal because
he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself at trial.  State v. Barnes, 
407 S.C. 27, 753 S.E.2d 545 (2014); see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 
(1975). In Barnes, the Court declined to adopt the heightened competency 
standard for a defendant who seeks to represent himself which is permitted, but not 
required, by Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). Since the Edwards
standard had been applied by the circuit judge, the Court held it was "constrained 
to reverse" respondent's conviction and sentence.  Id. at 37, 753 S.E.2d at 550. 
The State plans to retry respondent, and has indicated it will again seek the death 
penalty. Respondent sought the appointment of counsel to represent him in these 
new proceedings. At the appointment hearing, the State argued that in seeking 
representation for the retrial, respondent essentially conceded that his prior 
conviction was constitutionally obtained.  The State contended that in light of this 
concession, respondent's original conviction and sentence should be reinstated and 
this Court should proceed to review the issues raised but not reached in the first 
appeal.1  The circuit court denied the State's request. 
1 The dissent does not address the State's argument, reasoning instead that 
"Respondent has waived his right to counsel in his second trial . . . ."  From this 
waiver finding, the dissent concludes not that respondent must proceed pro se at 
this retrial, but rather that the waiver should result in the reinstatement of his first 
conviction. Thus, the dissent would not accord respondent a review of the non-
Faretta issues raised in his first appeal, a review that even the State recognizes is 
appropriate. The dissent's position rests not upon any constitutional or procedural 
basis, but instead upon its characterization of respondent's motives as "an effort to 
manipulate the system and pollute the administration of justice."  Even if we 
believe that a criminal defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights stem from 
impure motives, that motivation alone is not a basis to deny him these rights.  
Further, while it is unethical for an attorney to engage in conduct which tends to 
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ISSUE
Must this Court reconsider its decision in State v. Barnes, 407 
S.C. 27, 753 S.E.2d 545 (2014), in light of respondent's request 
for counsel in his second trial? 
ANALYSIS
The State argues that by requesting counsel at a pretrial hearing, respondent has 
conceded that there was no constitutional infirmity in his first trial.  Before 
addressing the merits of his claim, we look first at the procedural hurdle which the 
State must clear.   
In order to effect a review of respondent's first appeal, this Court would need to 
recall the remittitur from the circuit court.  "In order to justify this court in 
exercising the unusual power of recalling the remittitur after it has been sent down, 
a very strong showing would be required that the remittitur was sent down through 
some mistake or inadvertence on the part of this court or its officer . . . ."  State v. 
Keels, 39 S.C. 553, 17 S.E. 802 (1893). The State cites no authority, and we are  
aware of none, that permits the remittitur to be recalled, not because of an error or 
inadvertence on the part of the Supreme Court, but rather because of post-remittitur 
conduct by a party. Accordingly, we do not believe that even if we were to find 
merit to the State's position, that we would be empowered to grant the relief it 
seeks. See also Earle v. City of Greenville, 84 S.C. 193, 65 S.E. 1050 (1909).2  As 
explained below, we find no authority supporting the State's position in this 
matter.3 
pollute the administration of justice (Rule 7(a)(5), Rule 413, SCACR), we are 
unaware that this principle applies to a criminal defendant. 
2 "[W]hen points arising in a case before this Court have been decided, they 
become res judicata, and, when the remittitur has been sent down, this Court loses 
jurisdiction, and cannot, therefore, in the further progress of the case, render a 
different decision upon the points decided, so as to affect the particular case in 
which the decision was rendered." Id. at 196, 65 S.E. at 1051. 
3 Even if we were to find merit to the State's position, the issue would not be ripe.  
Respondent's right to self-representation is a trial right, and one that he may seek 
to exercise under state law at any time up until that trial commences.  See State v. 
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The State relies upon three decisions to support its contention that respondent's
original conviction should be reinstated, and the appellate issues not reached in the 
appeal be considered now, if he persists in seeking counsel at his second 
proceeding: United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2000); Edwards v. 
Commonwealth, 644 S.E.2d 396 (Va. Ct. App. 2007); and People v. Carson, 104 
P.3d 837 (Cal. 2005). Read correctly, none of these decisions provide authority for 
the State's position.  
In Johnson, the question on appeal was whether the defendant waived his right to
represent himself at trial.  The court held the defendant "acquiesced in the denial 
by judicial inaction of his motion and thereby deliberately relinquished his right of 
self-representation." Johnson, 223 F.3d at 669. Despite finding waiver, the 
opinion goes on in obiter dictum: 
We add that as he has made no representation that if we order a 
new trial he will persist in his desire to represent himself, his 
claim that his right of self-representation was infringed may be 
moot, as well as having no merit for the reasons just indicated.  
For if as we expect he would be represented by lawyers at any
new trial, he would not have vindicated the right of self-
representation upon which he premises his appeal from the 
denial of that right. The point is not that at a subsequent 
trial he would be estopped to invoke his right to counsel, an 
argument rejected in the only cases to have considered the 
issue. United States v. McKinley, 58 F.3d 1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 
1995); Johnstone v. Kelly, 812 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam).  The point is rather that if he wants on remand exactly 
what he had in his first trial, namely representation by 
competent lawyers, it is difficult to understand what he lost by 
Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 698 S.E.2d 596 (2010). See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 178 (1984) (The "core" of the right to self-representation is the defendant's
right "to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury.").  
That respondent seeks attorneys at this juncture, attorneys who have access to 
witnesses, investigators, discovery, law libraries, and other resources, does not 
mean that he will not choose to exercise his constitutional right to proceed pro se at 
the next trial. 
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the denial of his motion: he had at the first trial what he wants 
at the second. (emphasis supplied). 
Id. 
While this dicta merely speculates about the consequences had the court found the 
defendant was entitled to a new trial, it also recognizes that precedent is squarely 
against the position now espoused by the State. See United States v. McKinley, 
supra; Johnstone v. Kelly, supra; see also United States v. Kennard, 799 F.2d 556, 
557 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We reject the government's contention that, once a waiver of 
counsel has been given, a defendant is forever precluded from asking for an 
attorney in a later proceeding"); Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 807 fn.25 (3rd Cir. 
2000); State v. Figueroa, 897 A.2d 1050, 1053 (N.J. 2006) (and cases cited 
therein). The State nowhere addresses McKinley or Johnstone, despite the fact that 
the dicta it relies upon in Johnson expressly acknowledges them. 
The State's reliance on the Virginia Court of Appeals' decision in Edwards v. 
Commonwealth, supra, is also misplaced. The Edwards court remanded the case 
to the trial court for reconsideration of the defendant's Faretta request. The court 
indicated that if on remand the defendant withdrew his Faretta request, no retrial 
would be necessary.  This is only logical since the trial court was being asked to 
make an initial Faretta determination.  This decision cites the dicta from Johnson, 
supra, for the proposition that the defendant must persist in his Faretta request on 
remand or have his conviction reinstated. This Court, however, did not remand 
respondent's first appeal, but rather decided the merits of his Faretta issue, agreed 
with respondent, and reversed his conviction and sentence, leaving the State to 
decide whether to retry him.  Finally, the issue in People v. Carson, supra, was
whether the trial court erred in terminating the defendant's self-representation 
because of the defendant's pre-trial out-of-court conduct.   Carson reversed the trial 
court's order, but instructed the trial court to hold another hearing to determine if 
the defendant's Faretta rights had been properly terminated.  If they were found to 
have been, the judgment was to be reinstated, but if not, the State could retry him.
In our view, Carson adds nothing to the State's contention that at a second trial 
respondent must proceed pro se or have his first appeal reinstated and the non-
Faretta issues decided. If relevant at all, Carson holds that a Faretta violation 
mandates reversal of a criminal defendant's conviction.   
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The State relies on appellate decisions that remanded the question of the 
defendant's waiver of his right to counsel to the trial court for reconsideration.  It is 
apparent to us that the State now regrets that in respondent's first appeal it chose to 
argue only that the trial court's adoption and application of the standard announced 
in Edwards, supra, was correct, rather than to ask in the alternative for a remand if  
the Court were not to adopt Edwards. The State did not seek this alternative relief, 
we decided the appeal on its merits, and properly returned the remittitur to the 
circuit court. Respondent is entitled to the new trial, with all its attendant 
constitutional rights, pursuant to our decision in his first appeal. 
We also note with concern the implication of the State's argument.  The State's 
position is that the erroneous denial of a defendant's sixth amendment right to self-
representation at the first proceeding results in that defendant having a diminished 
sixth amendment right in a second trial. In other words, the State seeks to punish 
the defendant whose constitutional rights have been violated, a concept that is 
contrary to both justice and common sense.  Finally, it appears that the State's 
argument is an attempt to introduce a prejudice component into what is admittedly 
a structural error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150-51 
(2006) (prejudice is irrelevant when the constitutional right to self-representation is 
violated). As the Supreme Court explained "[s]ince the right of self-representation 
is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome 
unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to 'harmless error' analysis.  
The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless."  
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177, fn. 8. To the extent the State's argument can be 
characterized as "no harm, no foul," it conflicts with the United States Supreme 
Court's pronouncements on the sanctity of an individual's sixth amendment right to 
counsel/right to self-representation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the circuit court's ruling is 
AFFIRMED. 
BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur. KITTREDGE, J., concurring in result 
only. TOAL, C.J., dissenting in a separate opinion. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: I respectfully dissent.  I would find that Respondent
waived his right to insist on counsel by arguing and obtaining a ruling that he was 
deprived of his right to represent himself in his first trial.  In my opinion, such
waiver should be assessed on a case-by-case basis; however, the facts of this case 
warrant a finding of waiver. 
Here, Respondent has already received a full and fair trial.  However, in his 
initial trial, Respondent took the position that he desired to represent himself. 
Pursuant to Indiana v. Edwards,4  the trial judge decided that Respondent was not
capable of representing himself because of his lack of understanding of the 
complexities inherent in a death penalty case. We reversed on appeal, finding the
judge erred in applying the Edwards competency standard to Respondent's request 
to waive his right of counsel and proceed pro se. See State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 27, 
37, 753 S.E.2d 545, 550 (2014).   
Now that he has been granted a new trial on this basis, Respondent is 
requesting counsel. In my opinion, he cannot have it both ways.  Therefore, I 
would find that Respondent has waived his right to counsel in his second trial
because he already had a trial where he was represented by counsel.  See Barnes, 
407 S.C. at 35, 753 S.E.2d at 550 ("A South Carolina criminal defendant has the 
constitutional right to represent himself under both the federal and state 
constitutions. A capital defendant, like any other criminal defendant, may waive 
his right to counsel. So long as the defendant makes his request prior to trial, the 
only proper inquiry is that mandated by Faretta  [v. California, 422 U.S. 806 
(1975)]."  (internal footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted)).  Respondent's 
conduct here should be examined for what it is: an effort to manipulate the system 
and pollute the administration of justice. 
For these reasons, I would reinstate Respondent's prior conviction.
4 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
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PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion in 
State v. Scott, 405 S.C. 489, 748 S.E.2d 236 (Ct. App. 2013).  We now dismiss the 
writ as improvidently granted. 
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  
PLEICONES, J., concurring in result only. 
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PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion in 
Horton v. City of Columbia, 408 S.C. 27, 757 S.E.2d 537 (2014).  We now dismiss 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and further direct the court of 
appeals to depublish its opinion and assign the matter an unpublished opinion 
number.  The above opinion shall no longer have any precedential effect. 
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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JUSTICE PLEICONES: We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to 
review the Court of Appeals' opinion that found the trial court should have 
dismissed respondent's DUI charge because the videotape did not comply with the 
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statutory requirements for videotaping respondent's conduct at the scene of his DUI 
arrest. State v. Henkel, 404 S.C. 626, 746 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 2013); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 56–5–2953 (2006).  We reverse. 
FACTS
A witness observed a vehicle being driven erratically on I-385 and ultimately 

wrecking. Sergeant Hiott responded to the wreck and organized a search after 

learning from a witness that the driver had fled the scene.  Officers were unable to 

locate the driver and cleared the scene. 

Several hours later, Sergeant Hiott responded to a call indicating an individual had 

been found walking down I-385. When Sergeant Hiott arrived, he found 

respondent receiving medical care in an ambulance.  Sergeant Hiott read 

respondent his Miranda1 rights and conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) 

test while respondent was in the ambulance.  Sergeant Hiott initiated his audio 

recording device by a switch on his belt during the HGN test.2  After the HGN test, 

Sergeant Hiott learned respondent was not going to the hospital, so he led 

respondent from the ambulance to the side of his vehicle and asked him to recite 

the alphabet. Respondent failed both the HGN and ABC tests.3  The ABC test and 

Sergeant Hiott's admonitions while administering the HGN test were captured by 

audio recording. Neither test was captured by video recording.  Sergeant Hiott 

arrested respondent for DUI, placed respondent in his patrol vehicle, faced the in-

car camera towards respondent, and read respondent his Miranda rights again. 

Respondent sought dismissal of the charge alleging the videotape of his conduct at 

the scene failed to comply with the statutory videotaping requirements.  Subsection 

56–5–2953 (A) requires that an individual have his conduct recorded at the 

incident site, and that the recording must include that individual being advised of 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
2 This switch also activated patrol car's video recording camera.  This forward 
facing camera only recorded the highway in front of Sergeant Hiott's vehicle.  
When Sergeant Hiott arrived at the scene, he pulled his patrol vehicle past all of 
the other emergency vehicles.
3 No balancing tests were administered because respondent indicated he had an 
injured leg. 
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his Miranda rights prior to the administration of field sobriety tests.4  Subsection 
(B) provides several exceptions to this videotaping requirement: 
 
[I]n circumstances including, but not limited to, road blocks, traffic accident 
investigations, and citizens' arrests, where an arrest has been made and the 
videotaping equipment has not been activated by blue lights, the failure by 
the arresting officer to produce the videotapes required by this section is not 
alone a ground for dismissal.  However, as soon as videotaping is practicable 
in these circumstances, videotaping must begin and conform with the 
provisions of this section.   
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 56–5–2953(B) (2006).   
 
The trial court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.  The trial court recognized 
this incident was not a typical DUI stop because Sergeant Hiott's investigation 
began hours after respondent's wreck.  Accordingly, the trial court applied 
subsection (B), and found Sergeant Hiott activated the video and audio recording 
                                        
4  Subsection (A) states: 
(A) A person who violates Section 56–5–2930, 56–5–2933, or 56–5–2945 
must have his conduct at the incident site and the breath test site videotaped. 
 
(1) The videotaping at the incident site must: 
(a) begin not later than the activation of the officer's blue lights 
and conclude after the arrest of the person for a violation of 
Section 56–5–2930, 56–5–2933, or a probable cause 
determination that the person violated Section 56–5–2945; and 
 
(b) include the person being advised of his Miranda rights 
before any field sobriety tests are administered, if the tests are 
administered. 
 
We note that § 56–5–2953 was amended effective February 10, 2009.  See Act No. 
201, 2008 S.C. Acts 1682-85.  While subsection (A) was amended, the language of 
subsection (B) was essentially unchanged.  Respondent's arrest occurred on 
January 19, 2008, so the amended statute is not applicable. 
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as soon as practicable.5  The trial court found the videotape complied with the 
requirements of subsection (A) because it captured audio of the HGN and ABC 
tests. 
The Court of Appeals reversed.  The majority first looked to subsection (B) 
because the videotaping equipment was not activated by Sergeant Hiott's blue 
lights and Sergeant Hiott was conducting a traffic accident investigation.  The 
majority applied the language of subsection (B) which provides two qualifying 
provisions: "[h]owever, as soon as videotaping is practicable in these 
circumstances, videotaping must begin and conform with the provisions of this 
section." S.C. Code Ann. § 56–5–2953(B).  The majority found the language 
which requires "videotaping must begin and conform with the provisions of this 
section," necessitates compliance with subsection (A).  That is, the majority held 
that once videotaping begins, it must include all the requirements of subsection 
(A). Subsection (A)(1)(b) requires the videotaping "include the person being 
advised of his Miranda rights before any field sobriety tests are administered."  
Here, the first Miranda warning was not captured by audio or video.  Accordingly, 
the majority found dismissal of the charge was required because the videotape did 
not capture respondent being advised of his Miranda rights before the audio 
recording of the HGN and ABC tests.6 
Judge Geathers dissented and reasoned that to require strict compliance with 
subsection (A)(1)(b) would effectively eviscerate the exception in subsection (B). 
Judge Geathers observed an officer is required to begin recording as soon as 
practicable, and the "begin and conform" provision in subsection (B) was intended 
to require compliance with subsection (A), from that point forward. Judge 
Geathers stated "the initiation of the videotaping and conformance must each begin 
as soon as is practicable," and here, it was not practicable to capture video 
evidence of respondent receiving his initial Miranda warnings or performing the 
HGN and ABC tests. Accordingly, Judge Geathers would have affirmed 
respondent's conviction and sentence.   
5 The trial court's factual finding that videotaping began as soon as practicable is 
not challenged on appeal.
6 This same issue will not arise under the amended version of the statute because 
while it requires both the field sobriety tests and the Miranda rights be recorded, it 
does not require Miranda rights be given before the field sobriety tests. 
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ISSUE 
Did the videotape of respondent's conduct made at the scene of his traffic 
accident investigation comply with the videotaping requirements of S.C. 
Code Ann. § 56–5–2953, as it existed in January 2008? 
ANALYSIS 
The State contends the Court of Appeals misapplied the exception in subsection 
(B) because the phrase "as soon as videotaping is practicable" applies to both when 
the videotaping must "begin" and what it must show in order to "conform" to the 
requirements of subsection (A). The State argues the effect of the Court of 
Appeals' opinion requires, in situations such as this, the arresting officer to perform
Miranda warnings and field sobriety tests anew, in order to capture them on 
videotape, if they were first performed prior to the moment where videotaping 
became practicable. We find the language of the exception in subsection (B) 
ambiguous, and construe the exception to require compliance with subsection (A) 
need only begin at the time videotaping becomes practicable, and continue until the 
arrest is complete. 
"The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the legislature."  Bryant v. State, 384 S.C. 525, 529, 683 S.E.2d 280, 282 
(2009). However, "[a]ll rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one 
that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the 
language used, and that language must be construed in light of the intended 
purpose of the statute." State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 
(2010).
If the statute is ambiguous, courts must construe the terms of the statute.  Lester v. 
S.C. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 334 S.C. 557, 561, 514 S.E.2d 751, 752 (1999).  "A 
statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation 
consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers."  Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of 
Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606-07 (2006).  We 
have strictly construed § 56–5–2953. Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 
332, 346, 713 S.E.2d 278, 285 (2011).   
We find the language of the exception in subsection (B) ambiguous and construe 
the exception to require compliance with subsection (A) when it becomes 
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practicable to begin videotaping. Accordingly, we find Court of Appeals' majority 
erred, for two reasons, in finding once videotaping begins pursuant to an exception 
in subsection (B), that full compliance with subsection (A) is necessary.  First, the 
majority opinion violates the legislative intent of the statute.  Subsection (A) was 
intended to capture the interactions and field sobriety testing between the subject 
and the officer in a typical DUI traffic stop where there are no other witnesses.  
Roberts, 393 S.C. at 347, 713 S.E.2d at 285 (finding the purpose of § 56–5–2953 is 
to create direct evidence of a DUI arrest).  During a traffic stop, the subject, his 
vehicle, and his interaction with the officer can be videotaped by the car-mounted 
camera that is initiated by the officer's blue lights.  Requiring an officer to repeat 
Miranda and field sobriety tests on camera in a situation contemplated in 
subsection (B) is not consistent with the legislative intent of the DUI recording 
statute. 
Here, the legislative concerns with videotaping one-on-one traffic stops to capture 
the interactions between an officer and the subject are not present.  See Sweat, 386 
S.C. at 350, 688 S.E.2d at 575 (holding "language must be construed in light of the 
intended purpose of the statute."). Numerous officers and emergency personnel 
observed respondent's conduct at the scene.  Officer Hamilton testified he was the 
first responder that located respondent walking down I-385.  Officer Hamilton 
testified respondent was unsteady on his feet, he was confused, and he was talking 
with a slurred voice. Officer Terry testified he also responded to the call reporting 
that respondent was walking down I-385 and he believed respondent was definitely 
intoxicated. He explained respondent was slurring his speech, his posture was 
slumped over, and he smelled like alcohol.   
Second, the majority opinion fails to consider the statute as a whole.  Mid-State 
Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 
(1996) ("In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, a court should not focus on 
any single section or provision but should consider the language of the statute as a 
whole."). In effect, the majority opinion would render the exceptions for road 
blocks, traffic accident investigations, and citizens' arrests meaningless, if during 
an encounter it becomes practicable to begin videotaping.  The majority requires an 
arresting officer to repeat Miranda warnings and field sobriety tests if it becomes 
practicable to begin videotaping; especially when, as occurred here, Miranda and a 
portion of a field sobriety test were conducted prior to the moment when 
videotaping became practicable. We hold the phrase "as soon as videotaping is 
practicable in these circumstances," applies to both when videotaping must "begin" 
36 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
                                        


and when videotaping must "conform to the provisions of this section."   
Accordingly, we hold when an individual's conduct is videotaped during a situation 
provided for in subsection (B), compliance with subsection (A) must begin at the 
time videotaping becomes practicable and continue until the arrest is complete.  
Subsection (A) of the statute as it existed at the time of respondent's arrest only 
required respondent's conduct be videotaped and Miranda warnings be given prior 
to field sobriety tests. We find the audio recording of respondent's field sobriety 
tests adequately captured his conduct at the scene of the traffic accident 
investigation. Additionally, because respondent was given Miranda warnings prior 
to the time videotaping became practicable, we hold the videotape complies with 
subsection (A) because the videotape need only begin complying with subsection 
(A) from the time videotaping became practicable.  See footnote 5, supra. 
We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate respondent's conviction because the 
videotape satisfied the requirements of § 56–5–2953 once videotaping became 
practicable.7 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is  
REVERSED.
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. 
7 Because we find the videotape complied with § 56–5–2953, we need not address 
whether the totality of the circumstances exception in subsection (B) applies.   
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PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion in 
Rivera v. Newton, 401 S.C. 402, 737 S.E.2d 193 (Ct. App. 2012). We now dismiss 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and further direct the court of 
appeals to depublish its opinion and assign the matter an unpublished opinion 
number.  The above opinion shall no longer have any precedential effect. 
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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 JUSTICE HEARN: In this civil commitment proceeding, Christopher Taft
was found to be a sexually violent predator and was committed to the South 
Carolina Department of Mental Health.  He now argues the trial court should have
granted his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the SVP Act) that he was 
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presently likely to reoffend if not confined.  We agree and reverse. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The underlying facts of this case are tragic and disturbing.  Taft grew up in a 
family rife with intergenerational incest.  As a young child, he was sexually abused
by his aunts, uncles, and a number of older cousins.  As Taft went through puberty,
he became an abuser himself of his younger siblings.   
In June of 2006, at age fifteen, Taft pled guilty to three counts of assault and 
battery of a high and aggravated nature, stemming from the sexual assault of his 
sisters, then five and six, and his nine-year-old brother.  Taft was committed to the 
Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for six months, and the family court
suspended his sentence upon placement in a sex offender treatment facility and 
probation after his release. He was admitted to Generations Group Home, a 
facility for juvenile sex offenders in November 2006. After he was discharged 
from Generations in June 2007, he was remanded to DJJ until his release in July 
2008. Upon his release from DJJ, he was returned home to live with the same 
siblings he had previously assaulted. 
In March of 2010, Taft, then nineteen, pled guilty to two counts of lewd act
on a minor after being charged with two counts of CSC for fondling and engaging 
in intercourse with his eight and nine-year-old sisters.  He received concurrent 
sentences of fifteen years' imprisonment on both charges, suspended to three years'
incarceration and five years' probation. 
The State brought a civil commitment proceeding pursuant to the SVP Act
in July 2010. After an initial probable cause hearing, the court appointed Dr. 
Rebecca Jackson to evaluate whether Taft met the criteria for civil commitment. 
After examining Taft, Dr. Jackson issued a report on November 19, 2010, 
concluding he did not. 
The State sought another expert and retained Dr. Gregg Dwyer to evaluate 
Taft. However, Dr. Dwyer was in the process of relocating from the University of 
South Carolina School of Medicine to the Medical University of South Carolina 
and had not yet finished setting up his new lab.  Consequently, Dr. Dwyer was
unable to complete the evaluation within the sixty-day time limit required by 
statute. On February 17, 2011, the final day before the time limit expired, the State 
filed a motion for a continuance, requesting more time to allow Dr. Dwyer to 
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complete his evaluation.  
Taft objected to the request for a continuance,  arguing the SVP Act required 
that a trial be conducted within ninety days of the court-appointed evaluation, and 
the State's claim that its expert did not have time to set up his new lab did not
constitute good cause. Taft contended the State should have realized earlier that 
Dr. Dwyer could not meet the statutory deadline and obtained another expert.  The
trial court disagreed and granted the motion.  The court directed the evaluation be
completed by May 2, 2011, and set the trial for May 23, 2011.  
Prior to commencement of the trial, Taft moved to exclude the State's
second evaluation because even though it had been timely submitted pursuant to 
the trial court's latest order, it was authored by both Dr. Dwyer and a Dr. William 
Mulbry. Dr. Mulbry had been retained due to the continued difficulties with Dr. 
Dwyer's schedule.  Taft argued the report should be excluded because the trial 
court's order granting the continuance specifically authorized only Dr. Dwyer to
evaluate him. The court agreed, and excluded the report.  The trial court also
excluded any testimony regarding the second evaluation except from Dr. Dwyer, 
who the State acknowledged was not prepared to testify. 
Taft subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that absent any 
evaluation or testimony from Dr. Dwyer, the State failed to provide any evidence 
that Taft was a sexually violent predator.  He argued the only remaining evidence 
was the report and testimony of Dr. Jackson, who had concluded that Taft was not 
a sexually violent predator. In response, the State argued that it still had the reports 
of Drs. Geoffrey McKee and Jack Luadzers who had concluded Taft was a 
sexually violent predator in connection with his prior criminal investigation in 
2009. Taft, however, asserted those two reports were outdated and inadmissible 
because they were not probative of whether he was currently a sexually violent
predator. The trial court disagreed with Taft, finding the prior evaluations were 
admissible; it therefore denied the motion.  
At trial, the State offered the testimony of Dr. McKee, who had examined 
Taft nearly two years earlier in June 2009.  Dr. McKee discussed Taft's ability to 
accept and utilize the treatment he had received, and testified about the previous 
sexual abuse Taft had himself endured beginning at age five.  Dr. McKee opined 
that based upon his previous evaluation of Taft, he concluded Taft suffered from 
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"pedophilia, sexually attracted to females and nonexclusive type,"1 and that based 
on that prior evaluation, Taft met the statutory definition of a sexually violent
predator. He testified that in reaching these conclusions he had conducted several
risk assessment tests to measure Taft's likelihood of reoffending; based on Taft's
score on these tests, McKee determined he had a moderate to high risk of sexual 
recidivism. 
The court-appointed expert, Dr. Rebecca Jackson, also testified.  Unlike Dr. 
McKee, Dr. Jackson's opinion was based on her evaluation of Taft in this civil 
commitment proceeding.  Dr. Jackson opined Taft suffered from pedophilia, 
limited to incest, based on her finding that there was no evidence he was aroused 
by other females or other children.  Dr. Jackson testified that she performed one 
risk assessment test which scored him as having a twenty-five percent chance of 
reoffending in five years and a thirty-three percent chance of reoffending over a 
ten-year period. However, she testified that in her professional opinion, Taft did 
not meet the criteria of the SVP Act, and other measures short of confinement 
could effectively prevent him from victimizing his sisters again.  
At the close of the State's case, Taft moved for directed verdict, arguing the 
State failed to put forth any evidence that Taft presently suffered from a mental 
abnormality that made him likely to reoffend.  The court denied the motion, 
concluding it was a jury issue. The jury ultimately found Taft was a sexually 
violent predator. Taft moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again 
arguing lack of evidence, but the trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, Taft contended the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in 
his favor based on the lack of expert testimony that he was currently a sexually 
violent predator. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.  In re 
Taft, Op. No. 2013-UP-334 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Aug. 7, 2013).  This Court granted 
certiorari.
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the court of appeals err in affirming the trial court's failure to direct a 
verdict in favor of Taft? 
1 Dr. McKee's diagnosis indicated Taft is attracted to children under the age of 
thirteen, predominately female, and his attraction is nonexclusive so he is 
interested in children and adults. 
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
Taft argues the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of 
his motion for directed verdict.  Specifically, Taft argues the State failed to put 
forth evidence he satisfied the definition of a sexually violent predator because
neither expert testified that he had a present risk of reoffending.  We agree.
On appeal from the denial of a defendant's directed verdict motion, the 
appellate court may only reverse the trial court if there is no evidence to support 
the trial court's ruling.  In re Matthews, 345 S.C. 638, 646, 550 S.E.2d 311, 315 
(2001). In considering a directed verdict motion, the trial court is concerned with 
the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight.  State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 
588, 593, 606 S.E.2d 475, 477–78 (2004).  "A defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."  State v. 
McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 642, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2003).  Thus, a trial judge
should grant a motion for directed verdict when the evidence presented merely 
raises a suspicion of guilt. State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 
(2001). "'Suspicion' implies a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or 
circumstances which do not amount to proof."  Id.
The State bears the burden of proving a person is a sexually violent predator. 
In re Care & Treatment of Corley, 353 S.C. 202, 206, 577 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2003). 
Pursuant to the SVP Act, a sexually violent predator is defined as a person who: 
"(a) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts
of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, 
and treatment." In re Care & Treatment of Harvey, 355 S.C. 53, 60, 584 S.E.2d 
893, 896 (2003). A person is considered likely to engage in acts of sexual violence 
if "the person's propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as
to pose a menace to the health and safety of others." S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-
30(9) (2002 and Supp. 2014). 
It is undisputed Taft was convicted of a sexually violent offense and suffers 
from a mental abnormality; the sole question is whether the State produced 
evidence that his mental abnormality is such that he is presently likely to reoffend 
if not confined. The thrust of Taft's argument is that the State's expert testimony 
established only that he had a risk of reoffending in 2009 when he was evaluated in 
conjunction with the underlying criminal charges, and not that he had a risk of 
reoffending in 2011 in the context of this civil commitment proceeding.  The State 
44 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


contends the issue of present risk goes to the weight—not existence—of the 
evidence, and thus the trial court properly submitted the question to the jury.   
We find the State's evidence devoid of proof Taft has a present risk to
reoffend. Although the State's expert, Dr. McKee, stated that Taft met the 
definition of a sexually violent predator in 2009, he consistently refused to render a 
current diagnosis. Dr. McKee expressly testified that he "[did not] have the 
personal contact and the personal interview that [he] would need to do to form a 
current and active opinion" because "to be able to say whether [Taft] is a sexually 
violent predator now, [he] would have to be able to evaluate [him]."  In fact, Dr. 
McKee admitted on cross-examination that "as of [that day] he could not give an 
opinion as to whether or not [Taft] is a sexually violent predator." 
A civil proceeding to commit an individual, perhaps for life, following 
service of his criminal sentence, is an extraordinary remedy.  Although this Court 
has repeatedly held the Act constitutional, we decline to construe it in a manner 
which would lessen the State's burden of proof.  The General Assembly has 
carefully written our SVP Act to lay out exactly what is required to establish that 
someone is a sexually violent predator; the State must prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the individual is presently a sexually violent predator. See State v. 
Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 551, 564 S.E.2d 87, 90 (2002) (holding, in the context of an
ex post facto challenge, that the SVP Act "permits involuntary confinement based 
upon the determination the person currently suffers from both a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder and is likely to engage in acts of sexual 
violence" (emphasis added)).  Today, we give force to this requirement. 
We decline to accept the State's argument that an expert's evaluation from a 
prior criminal proceeding is sufficient to prove an individual is a sexually violent 
predator. If this were so, it would obviate any possibility of rehabilitation during 
incarceration. Further, it would violate the legislature's statutory scheme, which 
clearly envisions a new civil commitment proceeding based upon current evidence
that the individual suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that 
makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a 
secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. In this case, Dr. Jackson 
opined that Taft did not meet the definition of a sexually violent predator under the 
SVP Act and Dr. McKee testified he could not say Taft was presently a sexually 
violent predator because he had not evaluated him since 2009.  Accordingly, we 
find the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Taft had a current risk of 
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reoffending which would allow a jury to conclude he was a sexually violent 
predator. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court erred in denying Taft's motion 
for directed verdict. We therefore reverse.2 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur. 
2 Because our holding on this issue is dispositive, we decline to address Taft's 
additional argument that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 
grant of a continuance. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not 
address remaining issues where one issue is dispositive). 
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WILLIAMS, J.: Green Tree Servicing, LLC (Green Tree) appeals the circuit 
court's order finding Cynthia Hall and Robert Ballentine's (Respondents) statutory 
claims against Green Tree for violations of claim and delivery proceedings and 
notification provisions were not subject to mandatory arbitration.  We reverse. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 12, 1999, Hall was granted title to property in Blythewood, South 
Carolina, by her father, Ballentine.  On or around June 10, 1999, Hall completed a 
license application for a mobile home, listing herself and Ballentine as co-owners.  
On July 6, 1999, Respondents entered into a credit and sale contract (the Contract) 
with Green Tree through which the parties agreed Green Tree would finance 
Respondents' purchase of a mobile home.  Under the terms of the Contract, Green 
Tree agreed to loan Respondents approximately $68,000 with an adjustable interest 
rate. Hall agreed to serve as the primary obligor with Ballentine as the secondary 
obligor. 
The Contract contained the following arbitration clause:  
ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES AND WAIVER OF 
JURY TRIAL 
a. Dispute Resolution. Any controversy or claim 
between or among you and me or our assignees 
arising out of or relating to this Contract or any 
agreements or instruments relating to or delivered in 
connection with this Contract, including any claim 
based on or arising from an alleged tort, shall, if 
requested by either you or me, be determined by 
arbitration, reference, or trial by a judge as provided 
below. 
. . . 
b. Arbitration. Since this contract touches and concerns 
interstate commerce, an arbitration under this Contract 
shall be conducted in accordance with the [Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2009 & 
Supp. 2014)], notwithstanding any choice of law 
provision in this Contract.  The Commercial Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") also
shall apply. The arbitrator(s) shall follow the law and 
shall give effect to statutes of limitation in 
determining any claim.  Any controversy concerning 
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whether an issue is arbitrable shall be determined by 
the arbitrator(s). 
At some point after signing the Contract, Respondents defaulted on their monthly 
payments. On May 16, 2012, Green Tree repossessed the home.  Green Tree sold 
the home on June 11, 2012. 
On October 30, 2012, Respondents filed a complaint against Green Tree alleging 
breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  Additionally, Respondents raised claims
for violation of claim and delivery proceedings1 and violation of notification 
provisions2 (collectively "the statutory claims").  On November 29, 2012, Green 
Tree filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion to stay, pending 
mandatory arbitration. 
On June 3, 2013, the circuit court issued an order granting Green Tree's motion to 
dismiss in part and denying the motion in part.  The circuit court found it did not 
have subject matter jurisdiction over Respondents' claims for breach of contract 
and unjust enrichment because those claims were subject to mandatory arbitration 
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Contract.  However, the circuit court found 
the statutory claims were not subject to mandatory arbitration because the 
arbitration clause did not contain language indicating Respondents agreed to 
arbitrate statutory claims. Nevertheless, the circuit court found the arbitration 
clause was valid and enforceable because Respondents failed to present any 
evidence supporting their claim that it was unconscionable.  This appeal followed.  
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the circuit court err in finding the statutory claims were not subject to 
mandatory arbitration? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Arbitrability determinations are subject to de novo review."  Dean v. Heritage 
Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371, 379, 759 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2014) 
(emphasis omitted) (citing Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 398 S.C. 447, 453, 
730 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2012)). The circuit court's determination of whether a claim 
1 See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-69-10 through -210 (2005). 
2 See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 36-9-611 through -612 (2003). 
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is subject to arbitration will not be reversed by an appellate court if the finding is 
reasonably supported by the evidence. York v. Dodgeland of Columbia, Inc., 406 
S.C. 67, 78, 749 S.E.2d 139, 144 (Ct. App. 2013).  "[T]he party resisting 
arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for 
arbitration." Dean, 408 S.C. at 379, 759 S.E.2d at 731(alteration in original) 
(quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  "[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration."  Landers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
402 S.C. 100, 109, 739 S.E.2d 209, 213 (2013) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
Subject to Mandatory Arbitration 
Green Tree argues the circuit court erred in finding the statutory claims are not 
subject to mandatory arbitration because (1) an arbitration clause does not need 
specific language stating it covers statutory claims, and (2) the statutory claims
arise out of and are related to the Contract. 
A. Specific Language for Statutory Claims 
Green Tree argues the circuit court erred in finding an arbitration clause must 
include specific language stating it covers statutory claims.  We agree. 
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-28 
(1985), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that an
"arbitration clause must specifically mention the statute giving rise to the claims
that a party to the clause seeks to arbitrate."  In addressing whether claims arising 
under the Sherman Antitrust Act3 were subject to arbitration when the arbitration 
clause did not specifically include statutory claims, the Court found,  
Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be 
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention 
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory 
rights at issue.  Nothing, in the meantime, prevents a 
party from excluding statutory claims from the scope of 
an agreement to arbitrate. 
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2009).
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Id. at 628. Accordingly, the Court rejected the petitioner's proposed rule of 
arbitration clause construction and found specific language is not required for a 
statutory claim to be subject to an arbitration agreement.  Id.
More recently in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012),
the U.S. Supreme Court held a statutory claim arising out of the Credit Repair 
Organization Act (CROA)4 was subject to arbitration under the parties' arbitration 
agreement.  In CompuCredit, the contested arbitration clause stated, "Any claim, 
dispute or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise) at any time arising 
from or relating to your Account, any transferred balances or this 
Agreement . . . upon the election of you or us, will be resolved by binding 
arbitration." Id. at 668. The Court noted the FAA "requires courts to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate [federal statutory claims] according to their terms," "unless 
the FAA's mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional command."  
Id. at 669 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court found the 
CROA did not contain an overriding congressional command and the language in 
the parties' arbitration agreement was sufficient to subject the plaintiff's statutory 
claim to mandatory arbitration. See id. at 673. 
Likewise, in Landers, 402 S.C. at 114, 739 S.E.2d at 216, our supreme court held 
the plaintiff's statutory claim for illegal proxy solicitation under section 33-7-220(i) 
of the South Carolina Code (2006) was subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant 
to the parties' arbitration agreement. In Landers, the arbitration agreement stated 
that "any controversy or claim arising out of [or] relating to this contract, or the 
breach thereof, shall be settled by binding arbitration."  Id. at 104, 739 S.E.2d at 
211 (emphasis omitted).  In determining whether the illegal proxy solicitation 
claim was subject to the arbitration agreement, our supreme court did not create an 
exception requiring specific language for an arbitration clause to cover a statutory 
claim.  Id. at 113-14, 739 S.E.2d at 215-16. In fact, the court's discussion focused 
on whether the claim arose out of the agreement, not whether it was a common law 
or statutory claim. Id.
Based upon our review of the applicable precedent, we find no specific language is 
necessary for an arbitration clause to encompass statutory claims. Therefore, in the 
instant case, the circuit court erred in finding the statutory claims were not subject 
to mandatory arbitration because the arbitration clause did not specifically state 
Respondents agreed to arbitrate statutory claims.  See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679-79j (2009). 
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628 (holding no specific language was required for a statutory claim to be subject 
to an arbitration agreement); CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 673 (finding an arbitration 
clause without express language stating it encompassed statutory claims covered 
the plaintiff's statutory claims); Landers, 402 S.C. at 113-14, 739 S.E.2d at 215-16 
(failing to find the statutory nature of a claim was a distinguishing factor in 
determining whether a claim was subject to arbitration).  
B. "Arising out of or Relating to" the Contract 
Next, Green Tree argues the circuit court erred in concluding the statutory claims
neither arose out of nor were related to the Contract.  We agree. 
"Generally, any arbitration agreement affecting interstate commerce . . . is subject 
to the FAA." Landers, 402 S.C. at 108, 739 S.E.2d at 213.   
[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a 
dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate that dispute. The court is to make this 
determination by applying the federal substantive law of 
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement 
within the coverage of the [FAA].   
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
"[S]tatutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable 
pursuant to the FAA." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 
(1991). 
"Whether a party has agreed to arbitrate an issue is a matter of contract 
interpretation[,] and [a] party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any 
dispute which he has not agreed . . . to submit."  Landers, 402 S.C. at 108, 739 
S.E.2d at 213 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  "There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of arbitration 
agreements because of the strong policy favoring arbitration."  Cape Romain 
Contractors, Inc. v. Wando E., LLC, 405 S.C. 115, 125, 747 S.E.2d 461, 466 
(2013) (quoting Bradley, 398 S.C. at 455, 730 S.E.2d at 316) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
In the instant case, the Contract's arbitration clause contains the following 
language: 
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Any controversy or claim between or among you and 
me . . . arising out of or relating to this Contract or any 
agreements or instruments relating to or delivered in 
connection with this Contract, including any claim based 
on or arising from an alleged tort, shall, if requested by 
either you or me, be determined by arbitration, reference, 
or trial by a judge . . . . 
First, we find Respondents' claim for violation of the claim and delivery 
proceedings statute is within the scope of the Contract's arbitration clause.  In 
raising this claim, Respondents alleged Green Tree "failed to comply with the 
requisite formalities in undertaking an action in claim and delivery and, as such, 
[Respondents] were entitled to have remained in possession of the [home] until the 
appropriate procedures were followed."  This claim is within the scope of the 
arbitration clause because Green Tree's actions to recover the property as a result 
of Respondents' default created a controversy arising out of the Contract.  
Additionally, as our supreme court has noted, any doubt as to whether this claim is 
subject to arbitration must be resolved in favor of arbitration.  See Landers, 402 
S.C. at 109, 739 S.E.2d at 213 ("It is the policy of this state and federal law to 
favor arbitration and any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should 
be resolved in favor of arbitration." (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Accordingly, we find Respondents' claim for violation of claim and 
delivery proceedings is within the scope of the Contract's arbitration clause and is 
subject to mandatory arbitration. 
Next, we find Respondents' claim for violation of the statutory notification 
provisions is subject to mandatory arbitration.  With regard to this claim,
Respondents assert Green Tree failed to provide them with the notice required by 
statute to properly retake possession of the property.  We find this claim arises out 
of the Contract because Green Tree reclaimed the property due to Respondents'
failure to comply with the terms of the Contract.  Accordingly, Respondents' claim
for violation of the statutory notification provisions is within the scope of the 
Contract's arbitration clause and subject to mandatory arbitration.5 
5 In response to Green Tree's arguments, Respondents argued in their brief that the 
arbitration clause was unconscionable; however, Respondents abandoned this issue 
during oral argument.  Accordingly, we decline to address this issue.  See Folkens 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court's finding that the statutory 
claims were not subject to mandatory arbitration.  
REVERSED.  
FEW, C.J., and HUFF, J., concur.  
v. Hunt, 290 S.C. 194, 205, 348 S.E.2d 839, 845 (Ct. App. 1986) (declining to 
address an issue that was abandoned during oral argument).  
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